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In contrast,  much of Philippine policy,  and certainly  much of Philippine 
nationalism, has been defensive in character, designed to insulate and protect 
the economy from the outside world and the dangers perceived there.  What 
the  Philippines  needs  to  develop is  a  more  aggressive  and  self-confident 
nationalism,  one that  manipulates and takes advantage of the opportunities 
that the outside world offers-an  “inward  culture and an outward economy” 
rather than the reverse (Intal  1987). 
In fact, the situation in which the Philippines  finds itself today is not so 
different from the  situation characterizing  many of  the industrializing  East 
Asian countries before their rapid growth took place, although none had the 
foreign indebtedness that the Philippines now shoulders. Japan, Hong Kong, 
and  Singapore each  had  to  deal  with  an  unfavorable  economic  event that 
drastically  limited their options and forced them to focus on export growth. 
For Taiwan and Korea it was the imminent reduction in U.S. aid which had 
supported domestic investment and large current account deficits that forced 
the shift in policies. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  adversity  always  leads  to  success,  or  that  the 
problems  that  the  Philippines  now  faces  are no more  difficult  than  those 
faced  by  the  East  Asian  exporters.  Nor  will  Philippine  prospects  be 
unaffected by events and policies in the outside world. External markets that 
stay open to LDC exports, rather than  markets  that close down at the first 
sign of exporting  success, will  have  a tremendous  influence  over whether 
economic policy in those less developed countries encourages production at 
world  prices  for world  markets.  A  commercial  bank  lending  process  that 
recognizes  and  rewards  successful  policy  reform  and  economic  growth, 
rather  than  a  concerted  lending  process  that  provides  the  minimum  in 
financing  that  a  country  can  get  by  with,  will  also greatly  influence  the 
incentives  for  persevering  in  reform.  But  whether  the  Philippines  will 
ultimately be successful will be primarily determined by the actions that the 




insurgency which has troubled the Philippines for the past two decades. 
1. The tensions created by this migration are the primary force behind the Moslem 
2. Golay (1961, 202), Table 39. 
3. On the problems of collection of Philippine taxes, see Golay (1961, 186-91). 
Tait, Gratz, and  Eichengreen (1979) provide a comparison to  other countries, and 
rank  the Philippines near the bottom in tax  effort. 594  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
4.  U.S. direct investment in the Philippines increased from $149 million in  1950 
to  $415  million  by  the  end  of  1961.  U.S. direct  investment  in  manufacturing 
increased ninefold to account for half of the total by  1961 (Golay  1983, 140). 
5. Golay  (1983) has  compiled  a  list  of  sixteen  major  assets  sales  to  Filipinos 
between 1962 and 1972 totalling $246 million (152-53,  table 6). The source for the 
table  is  a  memorandum  written  by  the  American  Chamber  of  Commerce  in the 
Philippines. 
6.  Speech  before  the  Rotary  Club  of  Manila,  8 January  1970,  as  reported  in 
Central Bank News Digest,  10 February 1970, p. 6. Quoted in  Baldwin (1975, 76). 
7.  The  explanation  of  the  real  wage  decline  and  its  reconciliation  with  the 
national  accounts  data  has  become  a  lively  topic  for  research  and  discussion. 
Various sources of  wage data exist,  and  while the year-to-year  movements are not 
always consistent, they  all  show  a substantial decline during the  early  1970s. La1 
(1  983) has argued that the real wage decline can be explained by  a fall in the price 
of  (labor-intensive)  nontradables  relative  to  (capital-intensive)  traditional  exports. 
The reconciliation issue is addressed somewhat inconclusively by  Oshima, de Borja, 
and Paz  (1986).  They found that  between  1970 and  1980 real wages fell by  about 
10  percent  and,  at  the  same  time,  national  income  per  person  employed  rose  by 
about 25 percent. They argue against an  increase in  hours per person employed as 
an  explanation for the  income growth.  Nor does there  appear to be evidence  of  a 
substantial shift in income shares. One possibility that they raise is that the growth 
of national income may have been substantially overstated,  “perhaps  even by  one- 
half” (10). 
8. Average ODA receipts for  1969-71  were $79 million per year. From  1972 to 
1975 they  averaged $181  million  (OECD, Geographical  Distribution  of Finuncial 
Flows  to  Developing  Countries,  various  issues).  U.S. military  assistance  to  the 
Philippines also doubled during the period, from $60 million in fiscal years 1970-72 
to $119 million during fiscal years  1973-75  (Abueva  1979, 39). 
9.  The Marcos land reform was limited in  scope and has been widely criticized. 
However, it went further and was more successful than any previous land reform.  It 
also had high public visibility. Land reform was limited to corn and rice land, and did 
not include sugar and coconut lands. 
10. Marcos took Manila Electric Company from the Lopez family, as well as their 
holdings of  television  stations.  From  the Jacinto family he  seized a steel complex 
which became the National Steel Company. Among the initial arrests under martial 
law was Eugenio Lopez, Jr. The story circulated in the Philippines was that the senior 
Lopez was told that to see his son again he would have to sign over his fortune to a 
specially created organization,  the Marcos Foundation (Race 1975, 5). 
11. The sharp rise in the price of coconut products in 1974 was associated with the 
particularly large reductions in Philippine exports that year due to bad weather. The 
price of copra rose by  140 percent between  1973 and 1974, a period in which world 
exports  of  copra  fell  from  1.05 million  metric  tons  to  .53  million  metric  tons. 
Philippine exports fell from .73 to .29 million metric tons in the same period. Due to 
the Philippine’s large share in the world coconut market, Filipinos occasionally talk 
of  monopoly power in coconuts.  This one-year example lends some support.  Even 
so, the value of Philippine copra exports fell by  16 percent in 1974, suggesting that it 
is  not  a  very  profitable monopoly.  Data  from  UNCTAD,  Yearbook qf  Commodity 
Trade Statistics,  1979. 595  Philippines/Notes 
12. There is no single measure for the income effect of the terms of trade shock. 
The measure that we prefer focusses on the additional domestic resources necessary 
to  maintain  a  given  level  of  imports.  Philippine  terms  of  trade  in  1976 were  29 
percent below their 1970-72  average. The average import share of GNP in  1970-72 
was  19.2 percent. (.29)(.192)  = .0557. 
13. Since the Philippines was engaged in a conflict with Moslem secessionists in 
Mindanao, supplies of oil to the country were to be reduced by 25 percent under the 
terms  of  the  OPEC embargo.  In  1974 Marcos  declared  a  target  of  reducing  oil 
imports from 90 percent of energy supply to 70 percent in five years’ time. 
14.  Interview with  Gerard0 Sicat,  former  Director-General,  National Economic 
and Development Authority, Washington, D.C., June 1986. 
15. Over the same period the rates of export volume growth for other countries in 
the  region  were:  Korea,  16.4  percent;  Malaysia,  10.2  percent;  Singapore,  16.6 
percent; and Thailand,  17.0 percent. 
16.  In  contrast  to  other  countries  in  this  study, exports  of  services  make  up  a 
significant part  (one-third) of  total Philippine exports.  These include the rental on 
U.S.  military  bases,  but  also  the  supply  of  overseas  workers  and  construction 
services. Dollar earnings from exports of goods and services stayed roughly constant 
from 1980 to 1984. 
17. In a swap arrangement a bank would borrow abroad in foreign currency and 
then exchange the proceeds with the central bank for pesos. The central bank in turn 
agreed to sell foreign currency to the bank at a set exchange rate in the future, so the 
bank could pay back the loan. 
18.  The  year  1978  was  taken  as  the  starting  point  for  the  terms  of  trade 
calculation.  Between  1978 and  1982 import  prices  rose  33.1  percent  relative  to 
Philippine export prices. This multipled times the 1979 import share of GNP of 20.8 
percent equals 6.89 percent. The average interest rate paid on Philippine external debt 
rose  from  5.21 percent  in  1979 to  8.73 percent  in  1982. Rates  of  export  price 
inflation used to calculate the real interest rate were 5.20 percent (1975-79  average) 
and  -2.96  percent  (1979-85  average).  The change  in  the  real  interest  rate  was 
multiplied times the share of gross external debt, less foreign assets of the monetary 
system, in average 1979-80  GNP. These types of calculations are highly sensitive to 
the endpoints. The endpoints were chosen as reasonable approximations and produce 
neither the highest nor the lowest income changes possible. 
19. The ratio described is the increment in the capital stock (investment) divided 
by the increment in GDP. Divide numerator and denominator by the level of GDP to 
get  the  share  of  investment  in  GDP  divided  by  the  growth  rate  of  GDP,  the 
conventional  ICOR  measurement.  The  ICOR  is  an  ex post  and  far  from  perfect 
measure of the efficiency of investment. There are questions of the timing of  returns 
to  investment,  net  versus  gross  additions  to  the  capital  stock,  and  short-run 
fluctuations in  output.  Thus ICOR measurements  are sensitive to the  time periods 
over which they are constructed, and are more  useful when  measured over longer 
periods.  Furthermore,  ICORs  neglect  other  inputs,  and  therefore  do  not  really 
measure the profitability of  investment.  However,  despite these difficulties,  ICORs 
represent a rough, but useful, measure of the effectiveness of countries in generating 
growth from their investible resources, and that approach is used here. 
20.  The  rise  in  energy  prices  after  1973  made  investments  to  reduce  oil 
consumption profitable, even if they did not add to domestic final goods output, and 596  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
also made  investments  in  (generally  capital-intensive)  domestic  energy  production 
profitable. 
Chapter 2 
1. In  addition,  before  1976, the Philippine fiscal year ran from July to June. In 
1976, the fiscal year was shifted to January to December. 
2.  The rise  in defense  expenditures  is somewhat  misleading  since  many  of  the 
local police forces were absorbed within the  military, and the  share of justice  and 
police  in  the  budget  falls  accordingly.  The  military  did  increase  its  power  and 
influence, as well as its size, during this period, but the budget figures overstate the 
increase in defense as a budget activity. 
3. There was also a transfer of P.  1,300, about 11 percent of current expenditures, 
made  to  the  Philippine  Coconut  Authority,  which  purchased  First  United  Bank 
(renamed  the  United  Coconut  Planters  Bank)  in  that  year.  Domestic  prices  for 
coconut products were subsidized with a producers levy. 
4.  Average ODA receipts for 1969-71  were $79 million per year. From  1972 to 
1975 they  averaged $1 8  1 million  (OECD,  Geographical  Distribution  of  Financial 
Flows to Developing Countries, various issues).  Data on development loans is from 
Magno  (1976),  table  6. The  formation  of  the  Consultative  Committee  for  the 
Philippines  in  1970 was  also  instrumental  in  focussing  attention  and  organizing 
resources for the Philippines. 
5.  These transfers were P.  640 million in 1975 and P.  1.9 billion in 1976. Equity 
and net lending to government corporations again grew substantially at the end of the 
decade. See the line on equity contributions in table 2.2. 
6. Half  of  the  capacity  addition  came  through  new  plant  construction;  the 
remaining half came from the purchase of  existing oil-fired power plants  from the 
privately owned Manila Electric Company. 
7.  The details of  the Marcos decision  and Disini’s  role  in  it are the  subject of 
much controversy. Jesus Vergara, the former head of Westinghouse’s Philippine sales 
affiliate,  told  investigators  from  the  Aquino  government  that  Westinghouse  paid 
Disini a commission of at least $50 million, and that Disini gave Marcos about $30 
million of that. Westinghouse denies that money went to Marcos, but admits giving a 
commission of $17 million to Disini. A U.S. Justice Department and Securities and 
Exchange Commission probe was launched after the contract was signed, but a grand 
jury in  1978 voted not to indict Westinghouse under the Foreign Corrupt  Practices 
Act.  The  SEC’s  enforcement  division  was  reportedly  considering  in  mid-1986 
whether to start a new probe of the Westinghouse contract. See Dumaine (1986). 
8. The nuclear power plant has  figured prominently  in Philippine  proposals  for 
“selective  repudiation”  of its foreign debt, and the Aquino government has recently 
filed a suit against Westinghouse over the plant. 
9. Cash  generation  by  public  enterprises  was  relatively  small,  but  the  two 
government social security institutions provided savings of  about  1 percent to GNP. 
See table 2.16. 
10. For  a discussion of  the  NPC proposal,  see World Bank (1982),  vol.  1, pp. 
11. For a discussion see Oshima (1983). 
12. Presidential  Commission  on  Government  Reorganization  (1985b),  annex 
48-50. 
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13. Ibid. Table 7, p. 15. 
14. This  is  borne  out  in  several  comparative  tax  effort  studies,  referred  to  by 
Manasan (1982, 261 -62).  Tait, Gratz, and Eichengreen (1979) rank the Philippines 
41st out of 47 countries in their sample in terms of tax collection from existing tax 
bases. 
15. See Golay (1961), chap. 9 for a discussion of Congress and tax policy. 
16. See Kintanar (1976) for a discussion of the tax reforms in the early years of 
martial law. 
17. The  tax  amnesty  and  early  martial  law period  did  add  a  large  number  of 
persons to the taxable rolls, explaining part of  the secular rise in individual income 
tax collections. 
18. In  1977 the benefits of BOI registered firms under the Investment Incentives 
Act were estimated at P.  926.8 million (a little over 5 percent of total tax collections). 
Of  this,  about  half  represented  deductions  from  taxable  income  and  the  rest 
exemption from indirect taxes (World Bank 1980, tables 2.6, 2.7). 
19. IMF (1985b, 81), table 33. 
20.  Buoyancy  and  elasticity  are  two  measures  of  the  responsiveness  of  tax 
collections to income changes. Elasticity measures the response of  the existing tax 
structure to changes of income. Buoyancy is a measure of  the ex post change in tax 
collections with a change in income, including the effects of any changes in rules or 
rates. 
21.  Taxpayers with over P.  1 million in income accounted for 23 percent of taxable 
individual income and 61 percent of tax collected in 1978. See Diokno (1986), table 2. 
22.  IMF  (1985b,  31),  table  13.  The  estimation  procedure  used  only  urban 
household income, and is described in pages 26-30  of  that study. 
23.  IMF (1985b, 85), table 35. Two presidential decrees in 1984 eliminated most 
tariff and tax exemptions, but in the next few months a large number of the previous 
exemptions were reinstated. 
24.  An  article  in  Business  Day,  “Coconut  Fund  Nearing  P.  6  billion,”  1 
September 1980, gave a figure of P.  5.8 billion at that time. 
25.  Presidential  Commission on  Government  Reorganization (1985a,  65).  Mrs. 
Marcos,  who  was  minister  for  human  settlements,  was  also  known  for  soliciting 
“donations”  from corporations and institutions to support the various projects that she 
undertook. 
26.  Manuel  Montes  and  Emmanuel  de Dios  make  this  argument.  See  Montes 
(1986, 45-49)  and de Dios and Montes (1985). 
27.  BIR  employees  repeatedly  made  this  point  to  the  JMF  mission.  See  IMF 
28.  This  count,  and  in  general  the  statistics  available  for  government-owned 
corporations,  excludes  private  companies  that  were  acquired  by  the  state  due  to 
bankruptcy or default and therefore differs from the privatization list. 
29.  The most important  battles were the attempts of  the finance minister, Cesar 
Virata,  to remove the coconut levy and circumscribe  the trading monopoly  of the 
National Sugar Trading  Corporation  (NASUTRA) in  1981. Marcos  suspended the 
levy in 1981, but reinstated it after pressure from Eduardo Cojuangco. The Philippine 
cabinet overruled the proposal on NASUTRA in September 1981. See “Philippine 
Technocrats Lose Round in Fight to Depoliticize the Economy,”  Wall Street Journal, 
29 October  1981, p. 34. 
(1985h, 100, 103-4). 
30.  See IMF (1985b, 85), table 35, and the discussion (84-86). 
31.  See Amatong  et  al. (1985),  who  state  “the  study  concludes  that  [national 
government] contributions expand rather than reduce the need for borrowing”  (54). 
32.  Lamberte (1984), tables  1, 8. 598  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
33.  Since most of the forward contracts were drawn with public corporations, the 
losses were in a sense transferred from one public sector agency to another. However, 
the existence of the contracts may have meant a greater exchange rate exposure of the 
public sector, and thus greater losses, than it would have suffered had the operations 
of corporations like PNOC been uncovered. 
Chapter 3 
1. The major references  on Philippine trade policy  are Power and Sicat (1971), 
Baldwin  (1975),  Bautista,  Power,  et  al.  (1979),  Bautista  (1981),  Alburo  and 
Shepherd (1986), and Power and Medalla (1986). 
2.  See, for instance, Sachs (1985). 
3.  Hooley  (1985,  24,  26),  tables  6,  7.  Industry  output  data  show  large 
year-to-year variations in the Philippines, apparently due to differences in the degree 
of reporting, so conclusions about productivity in the Philippines must be somewhat 
tentative. 
4.  Baldwin (1975, lo), table 1-4. 
5.  See Alburo and Shepherd (1986), especially pp. 96-98. 
6. Power and Sicat (1971, 43) and Alburo and Shepherd (1986, 91). 
7.  George  L.  Hicks,  “Philippine  Foreign  Trade,  1950-1965:  Basic  Data  and 
Major Characteristics”  and “Supplementary  Data and Interpretations,  1954- 1966,” 
(National  Planning  Association,  Center  for  Development  Planning,  Washington, 
D.C., 1967; mimeo), cited in Baldwin (1975, 64),  fn.  18. 
8.  The product groups for which imports were regulated specifically for industry 
protection included textile fabrics, synthetic yarns, fibers and threads, basic iron and 
steel products,  newsprint,  used and new tires, synthetic resins, liquid caustic soda, 
cellophane and paper and paperboard products. 
9.  See de Dios (1986). 
10. This  policy  was  enforced  through  the  Board  of  Investment’s  control  over 
imports of  capital goods. 
11. Gregorio (1979, 217) and summary by Bautista, Power, et al. (1979, 33). 
12. Interview with Cesar Virata, Washington, D.C., November 1986. 
13. World Bank (1986), vol. 2, p. 145. 
14. World Bank (1987), vol. 2, pp. 94, 98, and table 3.1 1. 
15. Power and Medalla (1986, 24), table 3. 
16. In addition,  the Philippines did not have speculative capital inflows, such as 
17. See chapter  I, n. 7. 
18. See  Clunies-Ross  (1966)  and  Bautista  (1976)  for  analyses  of  Philippine 
inflation, and the review by Tan (1980, 226-35).  Food and beverages accounted for 
60 percent of the consumer price index in the Philippines as late as 1978. 
occurred in Chile. 
19. World Bank (1987), vol.  1, p.  17. 
20.  World Bank (1980, 53,  table 2.9. 
21.  Alburo and Shepherd (1986, 107), table 3.1. 
22.  American  Apparel  Manufacturers  Association,  ‘‘Apparel  Manufacturing 
23.  This overstates the actual decline in log exports, since undeclared and illegal 
Strategies,  1984,” quoted in World Bank (1986), vol. 2, p.  160, table 5.10. 
exports of logs increased substantially during the 1970s. 599  Philippines/Notes 
24.  During the international commodities boom in the early 1970s, the Philippines 
introduced premium taxes of 20-30  percent on the excess of  commodity prices over 
their February  1974 level.  These collections disappeared  when  international  prices 
fell below the base level. 
25.  Hooley (1985, 26), table 7. 
26.  Much of this was in energy and mining, as well as manufacturing 
Chapter 4 
1.  The Philippine sugar quota to the U.S. market rose from 864,000  metric tons to 
1.3 million metric tons  in  1961. The Philippines  gained  additional quota amounts 
when other producers failed to meet their additional quotas. 
2.  See Brown (1986). 
3.  Benedicto  was  also  regional  director  of  Marcos’  political  party,  the  New 
Society Movement,  and had been ambassador to Japan in the late  1960s and early 
1970s, when the Philippines contracted with Japanese firms to construct several new 
4.  Canlas et al. (1984, 81), table  13. The revenue estimates are after subtraction 
of a 10 percent allowance for trading costs. 
5.  “End  of An Experiment,”  Far Eastern Economic Review,  16 October  1981, 
p.  125. 
6.  David, Barker, and Palacpac (1984) show a decline in yield per hectare of 4.3 
percent per  year during  the  1960s, and a gain of  0.8 percent  per year  during the 
1970s. 
sugar mills. 
7.  Philippine Statistical Yearbook 1987, p. 270, table 5.1. 
8.  During  1970-82,  the number of nuts per bearing tree averaged 39 per year as 
against 42 nuts per year during the 1960s (NEDA 1985, table 1.13). 
9. The  share  of  coconut  oil  relative  to  the  sum  total  of  world  production  of 
soybean oil, palm oil, and coconut oil declined from about one-quarter in  1968 to 
about one-eighth in 1983; in contrast, the share of palm oil rose from about one- sixth 
in  1968 to about one-quarter in 1983 (Ibid., table 3.10). 
10. Canlas et al. (1984), appendix 1, lists 688 presidential decrees and 283 letters 
of  instruction that involved government intervention in the economy. 
11. See for instance, Sicat (1986, 28-29,  36-38). 
12. See Coronel (1986, 3). 
13. See Espinosa (1  986) for a discussion of the BASECO case. 
14. See, for instance, Mijares (1976, 197-202). 
15. There  are  various  sources  on  the  distribution  of  crony  assets.  See,  for 
instance,  Doherty  (1982),  Canoy  (1980),  and  the  Manila  Times,  16 May  1986. 
Extensive, but controversial,  information may become available if  the investigations 
of the Presidential Commission on Good Government are ever made public. 
16. See Villegas (1986,  163-64).  Imelda Marcos was once asked why so many 
relatives and associates of the Marcos government had profited so greatly during the 
martial  law  years.  She replied,  in  a  famous  quotation,  “some  are  smarter  than 
others.”  This  became  the  title  of  an  underground  analysis  of  cronyism  in  the 
Philippines that was ultimately published as Doherty (1982). 
17. This is not to say that there was no Competition among the cronies. Although 
instances are hard to come by, there was an attempt by  Eduardo Cojuangco to take 
over the  monopoly  trading  in  sugar-the  province  of  Roberto  Benedictein the 600  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
1980s when NASUTRA had financial difficulties. But the competition was generally 
over  exclusive  rights  in  an  industry,  rather  than  between  or  among  firms  in  an 
industry. 
18. Although, even without competition,  several of the cronies went bankrupt in 
the early 1980s. 
19. As Benjamin Diokno, an academic and now an official in the Budget Ministry, 
put it, “In advanced countries, the government intervenes when firms are in distress. 
We  did some of  that, but  [the Marcos government] tended to intervene when firms 
were  profitable”  (Interview,  Manila,  25  August  1986).  The  government  gained 
control of the export of labor services when that industry grew in size in the early 
1980s, and  had  plans,  before  the  1986 election,  to  intervene  in  the  videocassette 
rental industry. 
20.  Interview with Fred Whiting, President,  Sime Darby, Philippines,  Manila, 8 
December 1986. Sime Darby had been worried about Cojuangco during the last years 
of the martial law government, but found, after Corazon Aquino came to power, that 
Marcos’  son-in-law,  Freddy  Araneta,  had  intended  a  takeover  of  part  of  Sime 
Darby’s operations. 
21.  In order to provide a scale against which these amounts may be measured, one 
billion pesos in  1981 was roughly one-third of  1 percent of  GNP, and just under  1 
percent of gross domestic credit of the banking system. 
22.  Business  Day (Manila), 24 February 1983. Cited in Ibon (1983a, 7). 
23.  Ibon (1983a), based on news reports. 
24.  Lamberte (1984), annex A. 
25.  Lamberte (1984, tables 4 and 6. 
26.  The most publicly outspoken critic was Jaime Ongpin, brother of the director 
of  the National Development Corporation and, until October  1987, finance minister 
in the Aquino government, who termed these actions “the most disgraceful waste of 
public funds since independence.”  See his “A  Matter of Decree”  and “A  Matter of 
Principle”  (Manila; mimeo, ca. March  1983). 
Chapter 5 
1.  More general and complete descriptions of  the Philippine financial system are 
found in World Bank and IMF (1980) and Pascual (1984). 
2.  Asian Development Bank (1985, 37), table 4.1. For comparison, the figure for 
Thailand was 4.5 percent, Korea, 5.4 percent, and Indonesia, 0.1 percent. 
3.  PNB Bank is now a much smaller bank, since its nonperforming  assets have 
been transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust (AFT) as a part of the restructuring 
of  government  financial  institutions  carried  out  by  the  Aquino  government.  The 
current  intention of  the  government is to ultimately  convert  PNB into  a  privately 
owned commercial bank. 
4.  Lamberte et al. (1985, 30), table 3.8. 
5.  As was the case with PNB, the transfer of DBP’s nonperforming assets (almost 
90 percent  of  its  loan  portfolio by  1987) to the  APT  has  left  it  a  much  smaller 
institution. 
6.  These guarantees were not carried on the balance sheet of the institution. 
7.  The  financial  crisis  which  occurred  in  the  money  market  in  1981 and  the 
continuing difficulties of financial institutions in that market led to a greatly reduced 601  Philippines/Notes 
role for deposit substitutes, which accounted for only 6 percent of total liquidity by 
1985. 
8.  The fact that the lending by  foreign currency deposit units was almost entirely 
to domestic residents was not known by the Philippine’s external creditors. Thus, the 
net external debt of the monetary sector was almost equal to its gross debt, and much 
higher than external creditors thought. This was the surprise that was contained in the 
Philippine announcement that the country’s external debt, including monetary debt, 
was over $25 billion,  instead of the published $19 billion figure that included only 
nonmonetary debt. 
9.  In  1971-72,  when  ceilings  limited  commercial  bank  loan  rates  to  12-14 
percent, studies by  the National Economic Council (NEDAs forerunner) and Victor 
Barrios show a range of  14-29  percent (Tan 1980, 205). The World Bank and IMF 
(1980) study reported effective rates in the money market of up to  30 percent. 
10. Average for 1971-73. 
11.  Precise  ownership  and  control  patterns  are difficult  to  establish.  Estimates 
range from two-thirds (World Bank and IMF 1980, 8) to 23 out of 28 banks existing 
in 1980 (Doherty  1980, chap. 5), quoted in Patrick and Moreno (1985, 316). 
12.  Gregorio  Licaros,  then  central  bank  governor,  quoted  in  the  Far  Eastern 
Economic Review, 7 April  1978, p. 80. 
13.  The acquired banks  were Associated Bank (acquired by  DBP), Commercial 
Bank of Manila (GSIS), International Corporate Bank (NDS), and Union Bank (SSS 
and  Land  Bank).  The government  owned  two  additional banks,  Republic  Planters 
Bank, acquired in 1978, and Pilipinas Bank, acquired by PNB in 1980. 
14.  For a discussion of the “political  banks,”  see Patrick and Moreno (1985) and 
Canlas et al. (1984, 65-72). 
15.  In fact this understates the influence of the government in the financial system. 
As  one Philippine  banker put  it,  “Look,  everyone  made  behest loans.  You  would 
receive a phone call asking you to make a loan. If you refused you would have labor 
problems,  or the  Metro-Manila government would close you  down on a health or 
safety violation.”  (anonymous interview in Manila, 19 December 1986). 
16. Robert  Emery,  writing  of  the  1960s,  commented,  “the  Philippines  has 
probably had  more financial scandals, or financial institutions in distress, than any 
other Southeast Asian country”  (1970, 482). 
17.  LIBOR ranged  from  6 to  12 during  1974-79.  A  study  by  the  Ministry of 
Industry in the Philippines (cited in the World Bank and IMF 1980 study) also found 
foreign  borrowing  significantly  less  expensive  than  domestic  borrowing  for 
Philippine firms. 
18. From  Business  Day,  Top  1000  Corporations in  the  Philippines,  cited  in 
Lamberte (1989, table 3.10. 
19.  Dee  reportedly  suffered  huge  losses  in  commodity  speculation.  He  later 
surfaced in Canada, where he applied for asylum. 
20.  Asian Finance,  15 September 1981, p. 88. 
21.  The vast majority of central bank advances went to two institutions.  Atrium 
Capital, a member of  the  Herdis  (Disini) group,  received over P.  1 billion,  while 
Bancom,  an institution that had founded the deposit  substitute market,  received P. 
400 million. 
22.  Technically the commercial paper of  these firms had been sold to the public 
without recourse to the financial institution,  in large part to evade the regulation of 
the central bank.  In  fact, the instruments were in many cases accompanied by  the 
postdated  checks  of  the  financial  institutions,  and  many  institutions  allowed 602  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
pretermination of the investments. When the central bank stepped in, the default risk 
was removed  from the  public and placed  on the  institutions or, ultimately, on the 
central bank. 
23.  They  were  Republic  Planters  Bank  (1978),  Pilipinas  Bank  (1980),  Interna- 
tional  Corporate  Bank  (1981),  Union  Bank  (1981),  Associated  Bank  (1982),  and 
Commercial Bank of Manila (1982). 
24.  Development Bank of the Philippines, Annual Report,  1982. 
25.  The World Bank reports evidence that the Philippines paid significantly more 
for capital equipment (World Bank  1986, vol. 2, p. 133). Japanese companies were 
reported to have cooperated in these schemes, and that has been an alleged reason for 
the reluctance of the Japanese government to cooperate in the Aquino government’s 
investigations of  hidden wealth.  See  “Kickback  for Japan”  Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 24 April  1986, pp. 42-43,  and “Marcos  Papers Show Japanese Sought to 
Avoid Payments,”  Washington Post, 22 March 1986, p. Al. 
26.  Aide-mCmoire from DBP President Cesar Zalamea  to President  Aquino,  11 
March  1986. Cited in “DBP Bankrupt since Dec.  1983,” Manila Times, 29 March 
1986, p.  1. 
27.  “DBP Bankrupt Since Dec.  1983,” Manila Times. DBP president Zalamea is 
quoted  in  the  aide-memoire  as  saying,  “at  a  time  when  large  borrowings  were 
possible from both the domestic and international markets,  DBP did not hesitate to 
draw such funds to cover cash losses and pursue lending programs.” 
28.  “COA  Bares Bad GSIS Investments,”  Business Day (Manila), 10 September 
1986, p. 15. 
29.  “Government  May  Suffer  P.  70  billion  Loss,”  Business  Day  (Manila),  8 
September 1986, p.  2. The 30  billion peso figure is the difference between booked 
and total exposure to the nonperforming assets. 
30.  See Fry (1986) for a summary of the consequences of financial policy in the 
Philippines that makes many of the points listed here. 
31.  The importance of interest rate controls, or “financial repression,”  in reducing 
savings is controversial.  Fry  (1978) found  a  significant effect of  real  interest  rate 
levels on savings mobilization in a group of  Southeast Asian countries that included 
the Philippines, a finding contradicted by Giovannini (1983). For the Philippines, the 
periods of  substantial growth  of  financial intermediation,  the  1950s and the  early 
1980s, were periods when interest rate controls were absent or nonbinding. Controls 
also influenced the  form in which  savings were  mobilized,  as savings flowed into 
deposit substitutes and money market instruments in the  1970s. 
Chapter 6 
I. The Monetary Board is chaired  by  the  minister of  finance,  and  includes the 
governor of the central bank and the minister of planning. 
2.  The inclusion of  gross  short-term  external  debt  of  the  banking  sector  is the 
reason for the large jump in published figures of Philippine external debt that appears 
in  1983, from approximately $19 billion to $25 billion. 
3.  In  addition,  FCDUs  were  required  to  maintain  foreign  exchange  cover 
equivalent to foreign currency liabilities, and faced limitations on maturities of their 
lending. The relevant central bank circulars governing FCDUs are 343 (April 1972) 
and 547 (November 1976). Liabilities of these units are often referred to as 343/547 
deposits in Philippine statistics. 
4.  Central bank, Annual Report, vol.  1, various issues. 
5.  IMF, World Economic Outlook, April  1986, p. 243, table A47. 
6. Data from MEDIAD. 603  PhilippinesINotes 
7.  IMF (1984b, 129), table 56. 
8.  Gross  liabilities  of  the  banking  sector  were  an  additional  $5  billion,  or 40 
percent of  nonmonetary debt. However, in  1980 the Philippine banking system still 
had a small net asset position. 
9. See Cuddington  (1986)  and  Cumby  and  Levich  (1987)  for a  discussion  of 
measurement  concepts  for  capital  flight.  This  section  on capital  flight  draws  on 
Dohner (1987), where the measures used are derived. Cumby and Levich also present 
data for the Philippines and reach similar conclusions about the rise in capital flight in 
the early  1980s, well before the Aquino assassination. 
10.  Dohner (1987), table 4. 
11. Dohner  (1987)  estimates  regressions  equations  for  several  measures  of 
Philippine capital flight. The results confirm the importance of domestic and foreign 
interest rates and the real exchange rate in determining capital flight. 
12.  Figures  on  short-term  debt  collected  by  MEDIAD  and  the  central  bank’s 
Financial Plan Data Center differ, due to the latter’s more inclusive definition. Thus 
the figures in table 6.10 do not show a decline. 
13. Other  than  the  reserves  overstatement,  little  else  was  uncovered  about 
Philippine statistics. The employment, unemployment,  and wage data are subject to 
question, as is the true extent of savings and investment in the Philippine economy. 
But no additional examples of  data falsification arose. 
14.  The first was the Subcommittee on Major National Projects (SMNP) and the 
second was the Foreign Resources Subcommittee. The World Bank (1984a), chap. 4, 
has  a  good  description  and  evaluation  of  the  debt  management  system  in  the 
Philippines. 
15. Export-oriented  firms  were  also  given  approval  to  borrow  short term  for 
pre-export financing, raw materials, supplies, and spare parts. 
16. Interview with Cesar Virata, Washington, D.C., October 1986. 
17. Interview with Robert  Hess,  Chase Manhattan  Bank  Manila,  25 November 
1986. 
Chapter 7 
1. In most cases export taxes were increased from 4 to 6 percent, but taxes for 
coconut products were doubled, and taxes were introduced for the first time on coffee 
and tuna exports. 
2.  There was an increase in central bank credit to public sector enterprises during 
the year, but this was a relatively small part of  total financing. 
3.  Reserve  money  corresponds  to  the  conventional  definition  of  high-powered 
money4urrency in circulation, banks’ holdings of cash, and bank reserves with the 
central  bank.  In  the  Philippines  certain  government  securities  are also eligible as 
reserves. A more precise measurement of high-powered money is provided by what 
the IMF calls “base  money ”-reserve  money, plus reserve-eligible  securities, plus 
banks’ reserve deficiencies. It is only recently that longer series for base money have 
become available, and most policy discussions and program limits were phrased in 
terms of reserve money. 
4.  Rates were phrased in terms of  so many percentage points below the Manila 
Reference Rate (MRR). The MRR is the weighted average of the interest rate paid by 
the ten largest commercial banks on deposit substitutes or promissory notes of  ninety 
day maturity. 604  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
5.  The thirteen commodities controlled by the Price Stabilization Council included 
rice, corn  grits,  chicken,  eggs, pork,  sugar,  milk,  canned  fish,  and  some  school 
supplies.  Together these  commodities  made  up  24  percent  of  the  Consumer  Price 
Index. Rice alone accounted for 11.6 percent. 
6.  Price  interventions  by  the  government  took  the  form  of  price  ceilings  and 
differential  taxes  (for petroleum  products).  For  some  commodities  such  as  rice, 
government  procurement  policies  set  price  floors.  However,  Philippine  price 
intervention policies did not involve major subsidization by the government.  There 
were producer levies in the  sugar and coconut  industries that  supported consumer 
prices  for  sugar  and  cooking  oil  below  world  market  levels.  In  addition,  the 
government would occasionally  (generally  before  elections)  import  rice  and  other 
consumer goods to insure sufficient domestic supply. 
7.  Reserve money became an additional and more prominent monetary target due 
to the suspicion cast on net domestic assets by  the reserves overstatement,  and by 
disputes on what should be  included in domestic assets. Since net domestic assets is 
a balance sheet counterpart to net international reserves, an overstatement of reserves 
should also have resulted in  an understatement  of net domestic assets.  The reserve 
money  figure gained  prominence because  it was  more  easily  and more  accurately 
measured. 
8. The  crisis  started  after  leaflets were  spread  across  Manila  in  which  it  was 
warned that various banks were unsound, urging people to take their money out. 
9. This tax was 30 percent of the difference between the commodity price at the 
new exchange rate and its price at the previous exchange rate of P.  14 per dollar. At 
an exchange rate of P.  18 per dollar, this implied an effective exchange rate for the 
exporter of P.  16.8. 
10. In fact adjustments were  included to incorporate changes in reserve-eligible 
securities held by  banks and in reserve deficiencies, so that the targeted variable was 
in fact base money-total  high-powered money, or support for deposit expansion. 
11. The Philippine letter of  intent was published by  Business Day (Manila), 3, 4, 
and 5 January  1985. 
12. The bank advisory committee  was headed by  Manufacturer’s Hanover, with 
the Bank of Tokyo as deputy. It included Bank of America, Banque National de Paris, 
Barclays,  Chase  Manhattan,  Citibank,  Morgan  Guaranty  Trust, and  the  Bank  of 
Montreal.  Later,  Dresdner  Bank  and  Fuji  Bank  were  added  to  the  advisory 
committee. 
13. This  matched the  foreign  exchange assets  of  Citibank’s Manila branch  that 
were held outside the Philippines. Thus it did not involve a principal repayment from 
the Philippines. 
14.  As in the case of  the Citibank deposits, the issues at stake went beyond the 
Philippines. National Commercial Bank’s exposure to the Philippines was dwarfed by 
its  $4 billion  lending  to  Korea.  It  was  concern  about  a  possible  standstill  and 
rescheduling in Korea, more than  in  the Philippines,  that apparently motivated the 
bank’s refusal. 
15. The Philippine commercial  bank restructuring package  is described  in more 
detail  in  Bucheit  (1985),  Hutton  (1985),  and  Villaruel  and  Reyes  (1985).  For 
information about the FICORCA program, see chapter 8 of Edward Buffie’s study of 
Mexico in volume 2 of the Sachs series on developing country debt. 605  Philippines/Notes 
16. Only the program for restructuring private financial sector debt had a provision 
for the Philippine government’s assumption of private debts. The major dispute over 
government  assumption  of  private  sector  debts  came  in  the  PPI  case,  described 
above. 
17. The trade facility was also large because the Philippines had used trade finance 
to cover part of their balance of payments deficit through the central bank oil facility 
in the period prior to the moratorium. 
18.  Watson et al. (1986), table 40. 
19.  In this section, unless otherwise indicated, we measure the rate of inflation by 
20.  Data  from  IMF (1985c),  annex  1. This figure probably  underestimates  the 
21.  This  and  the  following  discussion  draw  on  Tidalgo  and  Esguerra  (1984, 
22.  Domestic credit extension of  the central bank is defined here as all other net 
domestic assets of the central bank, ie., net domestic assets plus the (positive) stock 
of outstanding CB securities. 
23.  World  Bank  (1987),  vol.  1,  pp.  10-11,  n.  19.  See  also  Montes  (1987, 
24.  The World Bank argues that these raised bank spreads by  seven percentage 
points in  1985 (World Bank 1986, vol. 2, pp. 25-26). 
25.  Philippines, Ad Hoc Study Group (1986, 23). 
26.  See  “Philippines  Reels  Under  Severe  Restraints,”  Asian  Finance,  15 
September  1986,  pp.  118-19.  IMF  Managing  Director  Jacques  de  Larosiere 
reportedly overruled staff recommendations and insisted on tighter conditions in the 
1984-85  program because of  the overstatement of reserves (Fur Eastern Economic 
Review, 26 July  1984, p. 49). 
the change in prices over the previous six months, expressed as an annual rate. 
drop in real wages that took place. 
75 -  82). 
28- 32). 
27.  Montes (1987) makes this argument. 
Chapter 8 
1.  See World Bank (1985, 8-19). 
2.  Business interest groups, such as the Makati Business Club, were established 
during this period. 
3.  Cardinal Jaime Sin persuaded the two candidates to unite on a single ticket and 
Laurel to accept the vice presidential spot. 
4. The  mass  mobilizations  of  civilians  around  the  rebel  army  camp  gave  the 
government transition its name, the “People’s Power Revolution.”  The story of these 
events is told in Johnson (1987). 
5. Philippines, Department of Budget and Management (1987, 3). 
6.  Ibid.,  14. The P.  24 billion is larger than that of table 2.16 because it includes 
transfers to the central bank. 
7.  For  further  discussion  and  analysis  of  the  Aquino  government’s  economic 
performance, see Dohner (1988). 
8. Philippines (1986), tables  1, 2. The large increase in the deficit of the national 
government is deceptive because it included transfers of liabilities from NPC  and the 
government financial institutions. 
9.  Sanchez was later dropped from the cabinet during a reorganization in late 1986. 606  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
10.  Arroyo and Ongpin had fought bitterly within the cabinet, and the departure of 
Ongpin was a condition for Arroyo’s resignation.  Ongpin was replaced by another 
businessman, Vicente Jaime, who had been appointed head of the Philippine National 
Bank by Aquino. Several weeks after he left the cabinet, Ongpin was found dead, the 
victim of  an apparent suicide. 
11. Their  1984 report (Canlas et al.  1984) was strikingly critical of  government 
economic policies. On the influence of University of the Philippine economists in the 
new government, see Rigoberto Tiglao, “UP Economists Gain Influence,”  Business 
Day (Manila),  19 May 1986. 
12. In  general orientation, particularly  in the  emphasis on rural-based  develop- 
ment  policy,  the  yellow  book  proposals  closely  resemble  those  of  the  1973 
International Labour Office study mission headed by Gustav Ranis (ILO 1974). 
13. The yellow book did argue for repudiation in cases where loans were made for 
fraudulent purposes with the knowing participation of the lender. 
14.  Compare for instance, NEDAs “Policy Agenda for People-Powered Develop- 
ment”  (1986). 
15. Not all of this is a net improvement in the government’s budget position since 
some  of  the  increased revenues  come from  the  withdrawal  of  tax  exemptions  of 
government  corporations,  which  would  be  offset,  at  least  in  the  short  term,  by 
increased  government  contributions  to  those  firms.  The  estimated  yield  from 
removing  tax  exemptions  was  P.  4  billion  in  1987  (Philippines,  Department  of 
Budget and Management 1987, 25). 
16. These efforts were supported by funds and technical assistance from the World 
Bank. 
17. Tax  exemptions  were  later  reintroduced  for  NPC,  and  reforms  in  power 
pricing have been very slow. 
18.  The  valuation  of  nonperforming  assets  varies  by  the  measure  applied;  the 
broadest,  which  produces  the  $7  billion  figure,  includes  unbooked  interest  and 
penalty charges. Total booked exposure of the nonperforming assets is estimated to 
be $5.5 billion. 
19. As a result of the restructuring,  the share of PNB in commercial bank assets 
was reduced from 28 percent in 1985 to 13 percent in 1987. 
20.  Business World (Manila), 8 December 1987, p. 3. 
21.  Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 November 1987, p. 84. 
22.  On the Philippine privatization program,  see Haggard (1988) and  “Manila’s 
23.  World Bank (1987), vol.  1, p. 38, quoting a study done by Rosario Manasan. 
24.  World Bank (1987), vol.  1, p. iii. 
25.  See  Koppel  (1987)  for  a  discussion  of  the  Marcos  land  reform  and  land 
manipulation experience. 
26.  Citibank was apparently supported in this position by the Bank of  Montreal 
(Wall Street Journal, 26 January  1987, p. 24). The Philippines reacted angrily to the 
intransigence of  Citibank in the negotiations,  and there were calls in the country at 
the end of  1986 for a reduction in the operating authority of the Citibank branch in 
Manila. 
27.  Under the proposal,  PINs applied to the spread only; the base rate (LIBOR) 
would  continue  to be  paid  in  cash.  The  accounting  implications  of  PINs  were 
ambiguous, and may have required that banks write down their holdings of Philippine 
debt. To date, no PINs have been issued. 
Hardy Privateers,”  Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 July  1988, pp. 88-93. 607  Philippines/References 
28.  Interest rate spreads on restructured debt of the private financial sector, where 
the lender retained the commercial risk, were higher, but could not exceed one and 
three-eighths percentage points over LIBOR. The repricing of  the  1985 new money 
facility carried  additional restrictions.  The  Philippines  agreed  to prepay  4  percent 
($37 million) of the facility before  1991, and also agreed that if the country missed 
any of its principal payments, the spread would revert to I percent. 
29.  A  peculiarity  of  the  Philippine  balance  of  payments  statistics  is  that  U.S. 
Economic Support Funds, which are an outgrowth of the current agreement on US. 
military bases, are included as service receipts.  The Philippine government regards 
these  as the  equivalent  of  rental  payments,  while the  U.S.  government  considers 
them aid. These amounted to $62 million in 1985, $300 million in 1986. Even after 
netting these out, the Philippines had small surpluses on service account in 1985 and 
1986. 
30.  These and other issues surrounding the 1989 debt negotiations are discussed in 
Dohner (1989). 
31.  In  1987 the Philippines was forced to import sugar on the world market in 
order to meet its export quota to the United States, so there is still some prospect of 
increased net export earnings as the sector recovers. 
32.  World Bank (1987), vol. 2. p. 266. 
33.  A study done by  the American Apparel Manufacturers  Association in  1984, 
“Apparel Manufacturing Strategies,”  gives the following productivity-adjusted wage 
comparisons for the industry: United States, 6.50; Hong Kong, 2.56; Taiwan, 2.33; 
Korea,  1.67; Jamaica, 1.36; Costa Rica, 1.33; Egypt, 1.10; Philippines,  1  .OO; Haiti, 
.80; and China,  .75. 
34.  World Bank (1987), vol.  2, p. 276. 
35.  World Bank (1987), vol. 2, p.  127. 
36. World Bank (1986), vol.  1, p. 25. 
37.  As Customs Commissioner Salvador Mison told his staff in November 1987, 
“Don’t take bribes. Accept only ‘tokens of appreciation’.” Quoted in Claudia Rosett, 
“Aquinos Embattled Democracy,”  Wall Street Journal, 2 March  1988, p.  21. 
38.  This  is  similar  to  the  notion,  developed  by  Albert  Hirschman,  of  “trait- 
taking”  technologies that are robust to corruption. He compares truck transport with 
rail transport in Nigeria, and concludes that decentralization and the ability to make 
fast,  on-the-spot  decisions  gives  trucking  firms  an advantage  over  the  rails.  See 
Hirschman (1967, 140-44). 
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